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In this paper I apply the Bread and Peace model of voting in US presidential elections to analyze the 
sources of George W. Bush’s narrow re-election victory in 2004. The aggregate election outcome is 
readily explained by the model’s objectively measured political-economic fundamentals – no appeal 
need be made to arbitrary count, trend, dummy and switching variables. The results imply that the 
2004 election turned mainly on weighted-average growth of per capita real disposable personal 
income over the term. The war in Iraq, which has escalated dramatically in political relevance since 
the 2004 contest, had a relatively small impact on the election result, most likely depressing Bush’s 
two-party vote share by less than a half percentage point. 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
George W. Bush achieved a relatively narrow re-election victory in the 2004 presidential 
election. Yet unlike his victory as the Republican challenger in the 2000 election when he 
won the Electoral College vote but received fewer popular votes than the Democrat’s 
candidate Al Gore, in 2004 Bush attracted a 51.24% majority of the total Bush/Cheney v. 
Kerry/Edwards popular vote.
1 
My analysis of how development of the economy and the war in Iraq affected the 2004 
election outcome is based on the “Bread and Peace” model introduced in Hibbs (2000) which 
analyzed the period 1952-1996. The model assumes that postwar American presidential 
elections for the most part should be interpreted as a sequence of referendums on the White 
House party’s economic record. My research showed that politically relevant economic 
performance is best measured by a weighted-average of quarterly growth rates of per capita 
real disposable personal income, computed from the election quarter back to the first full 
                                                 
* An earlier version of this paper was given at the 2007 joint meetings of the US and European Public Choice 
Societies in Amsterdam. I am grateful for comments received there. The paper was submitted to and ultimately 
rejected by the Quarterly Journal of Political Science as “unnecessarily acerbic” in its criticism of a paper by 
William Nordhaus published in the same journal that contrasted my model to various equations proposed by 
Nordhaus’ Yale economics department colleague Ray Fair. The QJPS submission, review, re-submission and 
rejection history is available at http://douglas-hibbs.com/Election2004/QJPS_History.htm  
1 I compute the two-party share from the official tally of the Federal Election Commission reported at 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2004/federalelections2004.shtml.    2
quarter of each presidential term.
2 Growth of per capita real disposable personal income is 
probably the broadest single aggregate measure of changes in voters’ economic well-being in 
as much as it includes income from all market sources, is adjusted for inflation, taxes, 
government transfer payments and population growth, and tends to move with changes in 
unemployment.
3  
The only additional factors I found that significantly affected votes for President in the 
postwar era were the discretionary US military interventions in the Korean and Vietnamese 
civil wars. My research indicated that the electoral penalties exacted by Korea and Vietnam 
fell almost wholly on the party of the President initiating the commitment of US forces (the 
“war party,” in both those cases the Democrats), and were proportionate to the cumulative 
numbers of American military fatalities at the relevant election dates. Regression experiments 
determined that the grace period for new presidents inheriting US interventions in Korea and 
Vietnam ran a full term. The implication was that the 1956 vote for Dwight Eisenhower (who 
inherited American involvement in the Korean civil war from Harry Truman) was unaffected 
by US military fatalities in Korea after Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, and that the 1972 
vote for Richard Nixon (who inherited American involvement in the Vietnamese civil war 
from Lyndon Johnson) was unaffected by US fatalities in Vietnam after Nixon assumed 
office in 1969. Hence the electoral effects of US military interventions were felt mainly in 
1952 and 1968.
4 
I want to emphasize that the Bread and Peace model is designed to explain voting 
outcomes in terms of political-economic fundamentals rather than optimally to predict 
elections using pre- election poll data on voter sentiments, preferences and the like. Such 
attitudinal variables are themselves generally affected by objective fundamentals and for that 
reason supply no insight into the ultimate causes of voting behavior. Applying the model to 
the 2004 election, I place the American invasion of Iraq (but not Afghanistan) on the same 
footing as US involvement in Korea and Vietnam, to wit: An unprovoked hostile deployment 
                                                 
2 Hibbs (1982) first proposed the weighted-average real income growth setup in a simple bivariate equation that 
was fit to eight presidential elections and took no direct account of the electoral consequences of US 
involvement in the Korean and Vietnamese civil wars. Hibbs (2006) reviews these and many more important 
issues in the now enormous literature on macroeconomic voting. 
3 However disposable personal income of course does not register benefits voters perceive from government 
supplied goods and services. 
4 Cumulative over-the-term US military fatalities at the 1952 and 1968 election dates were 29,260 and 28,896, 
respectively, as compared to just 414 over the term preceding the 1976 election, at which point the incumbent 
(Nixon-) Ford administration had exhausted the estimated one-term grace period.   3
of American armed forces in a foreign conflict never sanctioned by a formal Congressional 
declaration of war.  
THE BREAD AND PEACE MODEL 








Vote R Fatalities αβ λ λ β −
==
⎛⎞ ⎛⎞
⎜⎟ =+ Δ + ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎝⎠ ⎝⎠
∑∑  
where  
•  Vote is the percentage share of the aggregate two-party presidential vote going to 
the candidate of the incumbent party. 
•  R is per capita disposable personal income deflated by the Consumer Price Index; 
t R Δ  is the quarter-on-quarter rate of growth, expressed in annualized percentage 
points by multiplication by 400,  ( ) 1 log 400 tt RR − ⋅ . At the election quarter (j=0) 
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Δ ∑  such that the lag sum of annualized real income growth rates is 
expressed as, and its coefficient yields the electoral effect of, a weighted-average 
taken over the term. 
•   Fatalities is the cumulative number of American military fatalities (in 1000s) 
over the presidential terms preceding the 1952 (Korea), 1968 (Vietnam), 1976 
(Vietnam) and 2004 (Iraq) elections.  
Table 1 reports nonlinear-least-squares estimates of the Bread and Peace equation for the 
fourteen presidential elections spanning 1952-2004.
5 The model was fit using data available 
in July 2006 on per capita disposable personal incomes from the Bureau of Economic 
Analysis, data on the consumer price index (all urban workers) from the Department of 
Labor, and data on US military fatalities in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq from the US Department 
                                                 
5 The Stata program and data file used to generate all results in this paper are available at http://douglas-
hibbs.com/HibbsArticles/hibbs_downloadable.htm.   4
of Defense. According to the coefficient estimates in Table 1, each percentage point of 
growth in per capita real disposable personal income sustained over the presidential term 
boosts the in-party candidate’s vote share by around 3.6 percentage points above a 
benchmark constant of approximately 46 percent. In addition, the incumbent’s vote share is 
depressed by about 0.3 percentage points per 1000 American military fatalities owing to 
hostile, discretionary deployments of US armed forces in unprovoked wars.  
Table 1.  Bread and Peace Equation Estimates 
Incumbent Vote Share (Vote) 1952 – 2004  N = 14 elections   
 Adj  R
2 =.826  Root MSE =2.42  
 
 Coef.  Estimate Std. Error t-ratio|p-value
 
Constant (α ) 
 
46.2 1.24  37.3|0.000 
Real Income Growth ( 1 β ) 
 
3.61 0.615  5.87|0.000 
Weighting parameter (λ ) 
 
0.914 0.058  15.9|0.000 
Cumulative Fatalities ( 2 β ) -0.307  0.078 -3.95|0.003 
 
Expressed on an annual basis, the weighted-average per capita real disposable personal 
income growth rate during Bush’s first term was 1.72 percentage points. US military fatalities 
in Iraq stood at 1.13 thousand at the end of October 2004. The within-sample prediction 
(regression fit) of Bush’s two-party vote share from the Bread and Peace model is therefore 
52.08%, which yields a prediction error of  0.84% − :  46.2 3.611.72 0.307 1.13 52.08 + − ii   ;  
51.24 52.08 = 0.84 −− . These model estimates indicate that the Iraq war made only a small 
dent in the vote for Bush – depressing his two-party share by approximately 1/3 of a   5
percentage point.
6 However, if casualties continue to mount all the way up to the next 
election, Iraq could have decisive effect in 2008, particularly if on economic grounds alone 
that election would likely be close. But in 2004 the fundamental source of Bush’s re-election 
was real income growth over the term. 
The out-of-sample prediction of the 2004 election result is almost as good as the within-
sample prediction-fit. Estimated coefficients for the regression the sample range 1952-2000 
(        
12 46.3, 3.59, 0.91, 0.309 αβ λβ == == − ) are nearly identical to the full sample estimates 
shown in Table 1. The one-election-ahead, out-of-sample prediction of Bush’s two-party vote 
share is 52.16%, which gives a prediction error of  0.92% − . George Bush’s narrow 2004 
victory is then very well accounted for by the political-economic fundamentals in the Bread 
and Peace model.
7 
Figure 1 graphs the strong connection of votes for President to weighted-average per 
capita real disposable personal income growth over the term featured in the Bread and Peace 
model. The big effects of cumulative US military Fatalities were in 1952 (Korea) and 1968 
(Vietnam). The high fatality levels at the time of both those elections (29,260 or 196.8 per 
million population in Korea and 28,896 or 152.4 per million in Vietnam) most likely deprived 
the in-party Democratic candidates of victory (Stevenson in 1952 and Humphrey in 1968). 
Cumulative fatalities at the times of the 1976 and 2004 elections were too small to exert 
much influence. However, as I mentioned earlier, things may be different in 2008. By April 
17 2007 American military fatalities in Iraq had reached 3311, a US exit strategy had not yet 
materialized, and the accumulation of American body-bags was showing no sign of slowing 
down. 
                                                 
6 The 95% confidence interval for the effect of Fatalities is -0.15 to -0.54 Vote percentage points. Even at the 
extremity of the interval the estimated impact of the Iraq War therefore was not nearly large enough to swing the 
election. 
7 The Appendix to this paper reports actual and in-sample predicted vote shares for all elections generated by the 
estimates in Table 1, along with the election period values of weighted-average real income growth and 
cumulative Fatalities. The Appendix also reports estimates for the Bread and Peace equation when the military 
Fatalities variable is scaled to population. Aside from the parameter of the re-scaled Fatalities variable, the 
coefficient estimates in this regression experiment are nearly identical to those reported in Table 1. The 
estimates again imply that the Iraq war had only minor impact on the 2004 vote, decreasing Bush’s vote share 
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NORDHAUS ON HIBBS VIS-A-VIS FAIR 
In a recent article in the Quarterly Journal of Political Science William Nordhaus argues that 
the 2004 election outcome represents a “statistical defeat” for voting models that are based on 
fundamentals – a conclusion founded mostly on results Nordhaus obtained from analysis of 
various equations developed by his Yale economics colleague Ray Fair (Nordhaus 2006).
8 
However Nordhaus also makes claims about the adequacy of the Bread and Peace model and 
its prediction of the 2004 election result. The following assertions made by Nordhaus about 
the Bread and Peace model are erroneous: 
•  Nordhaus claims that “the forecast error [of the Bread and Peace model] for the 
incumbent vote margin in 2004 was ... 4 percentage points” (Nordhaus 2006: 317-
318, Figure 2). 
I do not know how Nordhaus computed a 4 percentage point prediction error for Bush’s 
margin using the Bread and Peace model because no information pertaining to my model 
                                                 
8 Nordhaus discusses results from five different sets of regression and forecasting experiments undertaken with a 
subset of Fair’s many specifications.    7
appears among the “full documentation with data, statistical programs, and regression files” 
to which Nordhaus directs readers for background documentation of his calculations. 
(Nordhaus 2006: 314)
9 Yet Nordhaus’ paper will give many readers the impression that he 
subjected my equation to the same analysis procedures he applied to Fair’s equations – 
estimation of rolling regressions using the most recently available economic data to compute 
in-sample predictions (i.e. conventional regression fits) and out-of-sample, one-election-
ahead predictions of the incumbent two-party vote share.  
However, when placed on the same footing as Nordhaus’ analysis of Fair’s various 
equations, the Bread and Peace model delivers in-sample and out-of-sample prediction errors 
for Bush’s 2004 vote margin that are well under 2 percentage points – less than half the 
magnitude asserted by Nordhaus. The margin variable used by Nordhaus is just twice the 
conventional regression residual (or prediction) error. For example, the Bread and Peace 
model’s in-sample and out-of-sample errors of  0.84% −  and  0.92% −  discussed at Table 1 
translate to vote margin errors of  1.68% −  and  1.84% − , respectively. Further, my point 
estimates of the effect of Iraq on Bush’s vote share in Tables 1 and A1 – in the range  1/5 −  to 
1/3 −  of a percentage point – yield an impact of approximately  0.4 −  to  0.67 −  percentage 
points on Bush’s margin, as opposed to “an estimate of around [minus] 1.3 percentage points 
using Hibbs’ equation” that Nordhaus reports. (Nordhaus 2006: 317)
10  
•  Nordhaus also writes that he made “an attempt to extend the Hibbs equation back to 
1916” and “found that the “peace” variable became insignificant.” (Nordhaus 2006: 
317, note 9)  
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis at the Department of Commerce (which 
publishes the official US National Income and Product Accounts), quarterly data series on 
disposable personal income begin in 1947. I conclude that it was not possible for Nordhaus to 
estimate the Bread and Peace model back to 1916 using the proper income variable. In any 
case, the discretionary hostile deployments of American armed forces in Korea, Vietnam and 
                                                 
9 Nordhaus’ background documentation is archived at http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/100.00000014_supp.zip. 
Nordhaus 2006:317, n.8 might imply that Nordhaus worked with a table posted at my web site on July 26, 2004 
about the implications of the Bread and Peace model for Bush’s likely vote share given data available at that 
time and under different assumptions about real income growth rates and the numbers of American fatalities in 
Iraq during the run-up to the November election date. 
10 Nordhaus’ computations are based on a Bush two-party vote share of 51.6% as opposed to the official tally of 
51.24%. A small error-in-dependent-variable therefore taints Nordhaus’ various regression-prediction 
experiments.   8
Iraq have nothing in common politically with American involvement in the World Wars. Fair 
evidently sees things the same way: In a piece posted at his web site after the 2004 election 
he wrote that his dummy variable War, which as noted ahead Fair added to his initial 1978 
model in 1996 in order to pick up fillips to incumbent vote shares at elections during the 
World War I and II periods, “has nothing to do with wars like Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.” 
(Fair 2004: 3-4) 
•  Although Nordhaus acknowledges that the 2004 “forecast error” of the Bread and 
Peace model was “much smaller than Fair’s equation,” he asserts that the Bread and 
Peace model “has larger errors than the Fair approach for most election years back to 
1952.” (Nordhaus 2006: 317) 
Here again Nordhaus’ claim is incorrect. A comparison of the absolute values of residual 
errors generated by the Bread and Peace model estimates in Table 1 (see Appendix Table A1) 
to the corresponding errors reported in Nordhaus’ background documentation (at page 6) for 
what he calls the “New Fair” and “Original Fair” equations shows that my model has smaller 
errors than both of those Fair equations in 9 out of the 14 Presidential elections spanning 
1952-2004. Moreover, the average absolute value of residual errors generated by the Bread 
and Peace model for those 14 elections is 1.49 percentage points, whereas the corresponding 
average absolute values of residual errors are 1.94 percentage points for the “New Fair” 
equation and 2.95 percentage points for the so-called “Original Fair” equation.
11 The standard 
errors of the regression (root mean square errors) reported in Nordhaus’ background 
documentation (at pages 4 and 5) for the “New Fair” and “Original Fair” equations are 2.62 
and 4.07, respectively, as compared to 2.42 in Table 1 for the Bread and Peace model. What 
should one make of regression errors and other fit statistics turned in by Fair’s equations? 
The list of regressors in the model that Fair settled upon initially, with variables defined 
with reference to the two-party vote share received by the incumbent party,
12 are: A general 
regression constant, C, plus (1) a switching variable Party that equals 1 when the Democrats 
are incumbent and -1 when the Republicans are, (2) a time trend t taking positive trend values 
                                                 
11 As shown ahead, what Nordhaus calls the “Original Fair” equation in fact does not correspond to any equation 
Fair ever used to fit and forecast elections. 
12 The actual “Original Fair” equation is written out in Fair 1978: 323, Table 2, Equation 4 and (more 
transparently) in Fair 1996a: 92, Table 1, Column 1. Until the 2000 election Fair used the two-party vote share 
of the Democrat’s presidential candidate as the dependent variable rather than the incumbent party vote share, 
and this required multiplying through the economic performance variables (but not the trend term and other 
coded variables as they are defined here) by the Party switching term defined just ahead.    9
at election years when the President was a Democrat and negative values when the President 
was a Republican, (3) a binary variable Person coded +1 when a sitting President was a 
candidate for re-election and 0 otherwise, (4) the election year growth rate of per capita real 
output G1YR, (5) the absolute value of the average annual growth rate of GNP deflator over 
last two years of the term, P2YR., and the independent vote getting ability of incumbents re-
running, VGA, which required a nonlinear restriction on the covariance matrix. This original 
model was revised repeatedly in years to follow in a series of update documents. 
In a 1982 update Fair replaced G1YR with the growth rate of per capita real output in the 
2
nd and 3
rd election year quarters only, G2-3.. (Fair 1982: 322) 
In a 1984 update Ford’s 1976 candidacy was re-defined to be non-incumbent so that the 
coding of Person changed from +1 to 0 for that election, Personex Ford. Also, the two-year 
annual inflation term P2YR was replaced by the absolute value of average inflation over eight 
quarters beginning one quarter back from the election quarter, P8, and the VGA restriction 
was dropped in favor of the conventional ordinary least squares estimator. (Fair 1988: 169, 
172-173, 176) 
In a 1988 update the initial trend term, t, was replaced by a new trend, t*, that stopped 
increasing in 1976. (Fair November 1990: 2)  
In a major 1992 update G2-3 was replaced by the per capita real output growth rate in the 
first three quarters of the election year, G1-3, a variable GoodNews2.9 was added that was 
equal to the number of quarters over the term in which the annualized per capita real output 
growth rate exceed 2.9 percent, the eight quarter inflation term P8 was replaced by the 
average absolute value of the GDP deflator growth rate over 15 pre-election quarters, P15, the 
once-revised trend term t* was dropped, and a new trend variable Duration was added that 
was coded 0 if the incumbent party had been in office for only one term at a given election 
date, +1 if in office for two consecutive terms, 1.25 if in office for three consecutive terms, 
and so forth by increments of 0.25.
13 Finally, a third new variable War was added that took 
values of +1 at the 1920, 1944 and 1948 elections, and 0 otherwise. And for those same three 
elections the empirical values of the economic variables P15 and GoodNews2.9 (but not G1-3 or 
any other variable) were arbitrarily set equal zero. (Fair 1996b: 125-127, 134) 
                                                 
13 At Fair 1996b: 127 and in other update documents Fair mistakenly defines Duration as being coded 0 if the 
incumbent party had been in office for one or two consecutive terms before beginning its trend values of 1.0, 
1.25 etc. However according to his various data appendices the actual coding used over time consistently 
satisfies the definition given here.   10
  In a 1996 update the growth rate threshold for “good news” was raised from 2.9 to 3.2 
percent – GoodNews3.2 – which was motivated by revisions to the measurement of real output 
in the National Income and Product Accounts. (Fair November 6 1998: 1-2)  
We have quite a remarkable stream of re-specifications which – to his credit – Fair 
faithfully cataloged, posted at his public web site, and freely admitted were wholly motivated 
by attempts to improve ex-post the fit of his equations to aggregate voting outcomes as one 
election followed the other. As Fair recently conceded “Much searching over many years has 
been done in arriving at the final [2004] version.” (Fair 2004: 5) It is clear that Nordhaus’ 
appeal to the favorable magnitudes of regression errors and fits prior to the collapse of the 
most recent vintage of Fair’s model in 2004 has no foundation in standard statistical inference 
– a point first driven home to economists by Edward Leamer in his famous 1978 book 
Specification Searches: Ad Hoc Inference with Nonexperimental Data.  
Moreover, as shown by the revision history of Fair’s equations summarized above, the 
equation that Nordhaus calls the “Original Fair” model is actually Fair’s initial 1978 equation 
after elimination of the secular trend term – an important alteration that Fair did not finally 
make himself until 1996 at which time several other variables were added or modified, as we 
saw above. Nordhaus uses the resulting hybrid equation – a specification that Fair never 
proposed himself – as the data mining benchmark for appraising Fair’s empirical track 
record, and the picture it conveys is misleading. In Nordhaus’ Figure 1 (Nordhaus 2006: 
315), for instance, the in-sample prediction error of the hybrid “Original Fair” equation for 
Ford’s margin in 1976 is depicted as -5.1 percentage points. Fair’s actual original equation, 
however, generated an in-sample error between -11.3 and -12.1 percentage points for the 
1976 incumbent margin (Fair 1982: 323, Table 1, Equations 1 and 2) – a residual which is on 
the scale of Fair’s huge error for 2004 and second only to his model’s implosion in 1992 
when GHW Bush’s margin was over-predicted by 19.6 to 24 percentage points depending 
upon the vintage of economic data used. (Fair 1992: 124; Fair 1996a: 94)  
Political-economic fundamentals logically consist of objectively measured policies and 
performance affecting voters. By this common sense standard Fair’s model is not composed 
predominantly of fundamentals. Four of the seven regressors in Fair’s latest equation are 
various trend and coded binary terms that bear no connection to objective policies and 
performance. And among the three economic terms, the oddly calibrated GoodNews variable 
– the number of quarters during a term in which the annualized growth rate of per capita real   11
output exceeds 3.2 percent (earlier 2.9 percent) – is a count variable that along with Party, 
Person, Duration and War was constructed by admission to neutralize election prediction 
errors of earlier specifications (Fair 1996b: 125-127), rather than being an impartial measure 
of systematic economic performance.
 14  
CONCLUSIONS 
George W. Bush won a relatively narrow victory in the 2004 election which is very well 
accounted for by objective measurement of economic performance in the Bread and Peace 
model – in particular the weighted-average growth rate of per capita real disposable personal 
income over the term. One need not resort to arbitrary political-count, trend, dummy and 
switching variables or to oddly calibrated economic-count variables to explain the voting 
outcome.  
American military fatalities in Iraq, which in principle might have had great electoral 
consequences, stood at 1,130 at the end of October 2004. According to the Bread and Peace 
model that number was insufficient to exert big effect on the 2004 election. From the 
beginning of November 2004 to the middle of April 2007, however, American military 
fatalities almost tripled. If flow of American military personnel killed continues at anything 
like this pace, Iraq may well prove decisive in the 2008 election. But in 2004 the election 
turned primarily on a real income growth record just favorable enough to keep the 
Republicans in the White House. 
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Fits and Predictions 
Table A1 below shows actual and in-sample predicted vote shares generated by estimates for 
the Bread and Peace model reported in Table 1 of the main paper, along with the election 
period values of the weighted-average real per capita disposable personal income growth and 
cumulative Fatalities independent variables.   13
 
























1952 44.60  45.90  -1.30  2.40  29.260 
Eisenhower 
v. Stevenson 
1956 57.76  56.65  1.11  2.89  0.00 
Nixon v. 
Kennedy 
1960 49.91  49.28  0.63  0.85  0.00 
Johnson v. 
Goldwater 
1964 61.34  61.43  -0.09  4.21  0.00 
Humphrey 
v. Nixon 
1968 49.60  48.23  1.37  3.02  28.896 
Nixon v. 
McGovern 
1972 61.79  59.27  2.52  3.62  0.00 
Ford v. 
Carter 
1976 48.95  50.00  -1.05  1.08  0.414 
Carter v. 
Reagan 
1980 44.70  44.82  -0.12  -0.39  0.00 
Regan v. 
Mondale 
1984 59.17  60.16  -0.99  3.86  0.00 
GHW Bush 
v. Dukakis 
1988 53.94  54.41  -0.47  2.27  0.00 
GHW Bush 
v. Clinton 
1992 46.55  47.58  -1.03  0.38  0.00 
Clinton v. 
Dole 
1996 54.74  49.98  4.76  1.04  0.00 
Gore v. GW 
Bush 
2000 50.27  54.75  -4.49  2.36  0.00 
GW Bush v. 
Kerry 
2004 51.24  52.08  -0.84  1.72  1.130 
 
The only postwar presidential election results not well accounted for by the Bread and Peace 
model are 1996 and 2000. A partisan of the Bread and Peace like myself model might be 
tempted to conjecture that idiosyncratic influence of candidate personalities took especially   14
strong form in 1996 and 2000 – with the ever charming Bill Clinton looking especially 
attractive when pitted against the darkly foreboding Bob Dole in 1996, and the unfailingly 
wooden Al Gore paling by comparison to the affable George Bush in 2000. This line of 
reasoning is of course entirely ad hoc and without scientific standing. 
Scaling US Military Fatalities to Population 
The US population grew from 158 million at time of the 1952 election to 295 million at the 
time of the 2004 election. A sensible refinement of the original Bread and Peace model 
(advocated by Nordhaus 2006:317) would be to scale the Fatalities variable by population 
size. Expressed per million US population, cumulative fatality rates among US armed forces 
at the 1952, 1968, 1976 and 2004 election dates were 196.8, 152.4, 2.08 and 3.86, 
respectively. As shown by Table A2 below, re-estimating the Bread and Peace equation with 
Fatalities scaled to population yields a small improvement to the model’s fit. Aside from the 
parameter of the re-scaled Fatalities variable, however, the coefficient estimates are nearly 
identical to those of Bread and Peace model with cumulative military fatalities not scaled to 
population size (as in Table 1 of the main paper). The within-sample prediction of Bush’s 
2004 two-party vote share is 52.23% and so the prediction error about  1% − : 
46.3 3.55 1.73 0.05 3.86 52.23 +− ii   ;  51.24 52.23= 0.99 − − . As in the main paper, the 
estimates imply that the Iraq war had only minor impact on the 2004 vote, decreasing Bush’s 
vote share by as 1/5 of a percentage point.  
 
Table A2.  Bread and Peace Equation Estimates with fatalities scaled to population
Incumbent Vote Share (Vote)  1952 – 2004  N = 14 elections   
 Adj  R
2 =.836  Root MSE =2.35   
 
 Coef.  Estimate Std.  Error t-ratio|p-value 
 
Constant (α ) 
 
46.3 1.20  38.5|0.000 
Real Income Growth ( 1 β ) 
 
3.55 0.595  6.03|0.000 
Weighting parameter (λ ) 
 
0.908 0.057  16.0|0.000 
Cumulative Fatalities 
per million population( 2 β ) 
-0.050 0.012  -4.15|0.002 
 